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Abstract—The Fourth Industrial Revolution has begun and
it promises breakthroughs in Artificial Intelligence, robotics,
Machine Learning, Internet of Things, Digital Twin, and many
other technologies that tackle advancements in the industries.
The trend is headed towards automation and connectivity. In
the automotive industry, advancements have been made towards
integrating autonomous driving vehicles into Intelligent Trans-
port Systems (ITS) with the use of Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks
(VANETs). The purpose of this type of network is to enable
efficient communication between vehicles (V2V communication)
or vehicles and infrastructure (V2I communication), to improve
driving safety, to avoid traffic congestion, and to better coordinate
transport networks. This direction towards limited (or lack of)
human intervention implies vulnerability to cyber attacks. In
this context, this paper provides a comprehensive classification of
related state-of-the-art approaches following three key directions:
1) privacy, 2) authentication and 3) message integrity within
VANETs. Discussions, challenges and open issues faced by the
current and next generation of vehicular networks are also
provided.
Index Terms—Keywords: VANET, authentication, privacy,
message integrity
I. INTRODUCTION
THe latest developments in both automotive and commu-nications industries, especially related to the emerging
Fig. 1. Heterogeneous Vehicular Networks Environment
As illustrated in Fig. 1, a Heterogeneous Vehicular Net-
works (HetVNets) environment, consists of the coexistence
of different wireless technologies like cellular Base Stations
(BS) (e.g., LTE/5G), Road Side Units (RSUs) and On-Board
Units (OBUs) based on cellular vehicle to everything (C-V2X)
as well as Dedicated Short-Range Communications (DSRC),
respectively. The aim of this HetVNets environment is to
provide Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I), Vehicle to Network
(V2N), Vehicle to Pedestrian (V2P) and Vehicle to Vehicle
(V2V) connectivity to overcome the sporadic connectivity
issues of highly mobile and dynamic environments. Because
of the widely deployment of the LTE network, it makes it a
promising solution to enable V2N communication. Another
option is the use of DSRC systems which are designed
to provide robust, low-latency, and high-throughput services
for V2I and V2V communications making them suitable for
safety and non-safety applications. However, because of their
sparse deployment and short range they provide intermittent
connectivity. Thus, the coexistence of these technologies cre-
ates a HetVNets environment able to provide a continuous
vehicular connectivity and enables the support for connected
and automated vehicles (CAVs). Thus, the advancements in
the development of CAVs led to the need of a commu-
5G networks, Internet of Vehicles and adoption of Vehicle-to-
Everything (V2X) connectivity, are fuelling significant trans-
formations in terms of driving quality of experience (QoE). 
The future 5G-V2X paradigm aims at enabling effective 
connected cars communication as well as fully automated 
driving that could increase road safety and improve traffic 
management. However, in order to enable support for these 
services as well as a new set of related applications (e.g., 
traffic p rediction, i ntelligent n avigation s ystems, cooperative 
collision avoidance systems, etc.) one of the key requirements 
is the provisioning and security of ultra-reliable low latency 
communication (URLLC) which cannot be guaranteed by 
the current underlying networks. The highly dynamic nature 
of the vehicular networks along with the heterogeneity of 
wireless infrastructures for connected cars (e.g., IEEE 802.11p, 
LTE-A, etc.) as well as the variety of vehicular applications 
(e.g., safety, traffic management, infotainment, etc.) makes the 
resource management, security and the low latency commu-
nication requirements a significant c hallenge t hat c annot be 
handled by traditional networking solutions.
nication medium between them, to allow coordination and
prevention of incidents. In this sense, Vehicular Ad Hoc
Networks (VANETs) have emerged, which are spontaneous
networks that allow the exchange of information between
traffic participants, providing a foundation for building new
vehicular applications that go beyond the scope of accidents
prevention.
The many services offered by VANETs heavily rely on
Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I)
communication. A vehicle can broadcast messages, to other
vehicles or to the infrastructure, about the weather, traffic
reports, anomalies in the road system, accidents, etc. These
messages can affect environmental awareness, traffic mobility,
and emergency services responsiveness, so it is important that
they are accurate, correct and trustworthy. In order to address
these challenges many different solutions have been proposed
in the research literature. However, despite the amount of
research done in this area, there is no global solution that will
completely respect the three security requirements identified
in [1], such as:
• Privacy and traceability: only a Trusted Authority (TA)
(see Fig. 1) should be able to correctly reveal the identity
of a message’s sender, while keeping it hidden from other
third-party listeners;
• Authentication: the messages have to be signed by the
senders so that only legitimate traffic participants receive
authorization to join the network;
• Message integrity: the messages have to arrive to their
destination unaltered.
In this context, this paper presents a comprehensive survey
on the latest approaches related to the three key security
requirements, such as Privacy, Authentication and Integrity
within the context of vehicular networks. The rest of the
paper is structured as follows: Section II delves into the latest
proposals for privacy-preserving mechanisms. Section III eval-
uates authentication mechanisms that have surfaced over the
last few years, Section IV explores the way message integrity
can be assured, while discussions on the challenges and open
issues related to the three directions surveyed are provided in
Section V. Lastly, Section VI draws the conclusions.
II. PRIVACY
In order for the V2V technology to be effective in support-
ing V2V safety applications, the vehicles must periodically
broadcast Basic Safety Messages (BSM) conveying critical
vehicle state information to their neighbours or infrastructure
and prevent potential collisions. In this context, one of the vital
requirements for public acceptance of VANET deployment is
privacy. The anonymity of the exchanged information in the
network should be kept and the messages should be protected
in the presence of an unapproved observer and any information
about its sender should not be revealed. Moreover, the actions
of the sender should not be linked to its source.
As seen in previous studies, data gathered from basic safety
messages can contain GPS location information and this can
Fig. 2. Security Credential Management System Architecture
lead to profiling and uniquely identifying the person using this
particular vehicle [2].
The Crash Avoidance Metrics Partners LLC together with
the U.S Department of Transportation have developed a
Security Credential Management System (SCMS) for V2X
communication to overcome the deep privacy concerns of the
public. The system requires the connected vehicles to enroll
into the SCMS and obtain security certificates from certificate
authorities (CAs). The certificates are then attached to the
messages exchanged as part of a digital signature to build trust
among participants, similar to the public-key infrastructure
concept. A simplified architecture of SCMS is presented in
Fig. 2 [3] and consists of: V2V or V2I enabled device
(e.g., On-Board Units, Road-Side Units, After-market Safety
Device, etc.); Enrolment CA will issue enrolment certificates
to the connected devices; Location Obscurer Proxy will hide
the location of the requesting device and prevents the mapping
of the network address to location; Pseudonym CA will issue
short-term certificates to the connected devices; Misbehaviour
Authority will process misbehaviour reports and identifies
potential misbehaviour by devices; the Root CA will provide
the system wide trust through certificates issues to all entities
involved; and the Intermediate CA will shield the root CA
from traffic and attacks. Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL)
[4] are used to distribute the revocation information in case a
certificate owner is involved in malicious behaviour. However,
because the pseudonyms are changed frequently to guarantee
security and privacy, this increases the revocation efficiency.
A malicious user is revoked by adding all its pseudonyms to
the CRL making the updating and distribution procedure of
the CRL list result in large message overheads. This makes
the SCMS to be expensive [3] as it will have to deal with
large certificate revocation lists while considering the storage
limitations on the connected devices.
To overcome these drawbacks, several extensions to the
SCMS have been proposed in the literature [5], [6], [7].
Michelson et al. [5] investigate a new way for reporting
interference to DSRC networks and propose to clone a second
instance of the subsystem used to report untrustworthy digital
certificates within SCMS and use it to deliver reports of possi-
ble interference events to a Spectrum Misbehavior Authority.
The authors make use of a real experimental setup to demon-
strate the viability of the interference detection schemes within
IEEE 802.11p devices. Jha et al. [6] extend the SCMS with
cross certification capabilities. Considering the scenario where
several autonomous regions may have their own trust roots,
the authors propose a cross-certified trust root where vehicles
from one region may validate BSM messages of vehicles from
another region that has been cross-certified between the two
trust roots. The performance evaluation validated the proposed
algorithm under an equal mixture of local and cross-certified
vehicular traffic. Bao et al. [7] propose a distributed frame-
work for providing efficient certificate revocation service by
making use of the blockchain concept. The proposed solution
significantly reduces the size of the Certificate Revocation
List as well as the communication overhead and shortens the
processing time.
Despite the amount of research done in this area, the per-
vasive nature of current and future autonomous and connected
vehicles makes the privacy issues one of the key challenges.
This is because, the nature of the vehicular networks, requires
some user privacy data to be open to trusted third-parties (e.g.,
police, accident rescue, etc.) in case of emergency situation
(e.g., accidents) while also enabling the detection and tracking
of malicious behaviour within the network. Consequently,
the following privacy issues are of concern for the next 5G
V2X architecture [8]: (1) identity privacy - deals with the
disclosure of identity information that could be linked to a
specific user and expose the subscriber’s identity. (2) content
privacy - deals with the disclosure of sensitive information
from different types of content that could result in user privacy
breaches. (3) contextual privacy - deals with the disclosure of
services a specific user is accessing by linking the source and
destination of a packet within the communication path. (4)
location privacy - deals with the disclosure of the current and
past locations of a specific user.
III. AUTHENTICATION
Another key challenge when dealing with security issues
in vehicular communications, is the authentication. Authen-
tication is done by signing the outbound messages with the
sender’s identity in a way that respects the aforementioned
principles. In this way, the receivers can confirm the messages’
validity. To accomplish this, a number of protocols have been
proposed, using different communication patterns: (1) V2I
authentication, in which the identity of a vehicle is verified
by the fixed RSU; (2) group-based authentication, in which
vehicles are authenticated by a Group Leader, who is in turn
authenticated by the RSU; or (3) V2V authentication, where
the identity of a vehicle is confirmed through an exchange of
locality information between vehicles.
A. V2I authentication
DSRC enables V2V and V2I communication by building
wireless ad-hoc networks in a given area. DSRC messages
contain safety and traffic information and they are broadcast
through 100ms long time slots [9]. This means that, in a
VANET, each vehicle would transmit 10 messages per second
to its neighbouring vehicles and RSU, and each of them
would have to be signed. One of the most widely used
authentication mechanism is the digital signature used by
the public key infrastructure (PKI) technology. PKI is an
asymmetric cryptosystem using two keys: a public one and a
private one. However, given the significant message overhead
this technique induces, it can only be used in a V2I setting,
where the authentication procedure is more centralised: instead
of having the vehicles authenticate each other, the closest RSU
will verify the messages.
To reduce processing time and requirements, Zhang et
al. [10] proposed an Identity-based Batch Verification (IBV)
protocol which relieves PKI’s need for certificates and relies
instead on fake identities and private keys generated by
each vehicle’s tamper-proof device (TPD) (assumed to be
invulnerable to any kind of security risks). The premise of
this solution is assigning a unique identifier to each vehicle’s
TPD, henceforth called a real identity, which will ensure
traceability by the TA. The TPD will create an array of random
pseudo-identities and private keys from the real identity using
a random variable, the ElGamal encryption algorithm, and
identity-based cryptography. Every 100ms, a vehicle will send
out a tuple containing one pseudo-identity chosen from the list,
the useful message, and a digital signature computed with the
help of the corresponding private keys. Since the vehicle has
a list of fake identities at its disposal and each message will
be using a different digital signature, this paper claims that
there is no linkability between the messages, eliminating the
threat of man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. While linkability
is indeed made difficult by this protocol, it is not impossible,
since each vehicle only has a finite list of pseudo-identities
and private keys that it signs its messages with.
Other issues with this authentication scheme are exposed in
[1]. The authors point out how each pseudo-identity is strictly
connected to the real identity, and every 100ms, the vehicle
broadcasts its fake identity along with the message and digital
signature, thus exposing the vehicle to impersonation attacks.
In fact, the broadcast messages offer enough information for
any third-party listener to also successfully reveal the real
identity of the vehicle, compromising its privacy. [1] proposes
introducing another parameter, a shared secret between the
RSU and the vehicle, to contribute to the generation of the
digital signature, thus eliminating the one-to-one connection
between the pseudo-identity and generated signature. The
shared secret is generated by the TA and communicated only
once using the PKI.
Both of these approaches use the infrastructure to authen-
ticate the messages. However, in a dense traffic scenario,
the RSU could be overloaded with messages that it has to
authenticate one by one. The IBV protocol puts forward a
batch authentication scheme whose duration depends on the
number of applied operations, rather than the size of the
batch. However, this approach is prone to significant data loss
because if one signature is not valid, the RSU will drop the
whole batch. [1] comes up with a verification scheme that
focuses on finding invalid signatures into the batch by applying
a binary search algorithm. First, the whole batch is checked. If
an error is found, instead of dropping the batch, it will be split
in half and the batch verification will be applied again on the
valid half. The process stops when an inconsequential batch
size is achieved. This approach is more efficient at preventing
data loss, but at the same time it is more time consuming
because of its repetitive structure.
B. Hybrid authentication
To provide context for this hybrid authentication approach,
we are going to revisit the initial issue of the generally
accepted approach for an authentication scheme - the digi-
tal signature using PKI. As mentioned before, the overhead
induced by this technique is so large that, in a congestion
scenario, the RSU would not be able to process the high
volume of messages in the 100ms window provided by DSRC.
In order to relieve some of the RSU’s load, one solution would
be group-based authentication techniques, in which the RSU
or the CA would need only to assign group digital signatures
to a conglomeration of vehicles, rather than to each car in part.
Hasrouny et al. [11] propose such a scheme, making use of
a hierarchical structure inside the group. The authors introduce
the notion of a Group Leader (GL) - the vehicle responsible
with the key generation and distribution within the 300m-
radius group of at least two vehicles. The GL is the first vehicle
in a given area that authenticates with the RSU. Each other
vehicle will broadcast a tuple containing its identity, location,
a timestamp and status. The leading entity’s responsibility is
to listen for new nearby vehicles’ messages and authenticate
them into the group by communicating the group ID and
newly generated encryption keys. It is noteworthy that these
two parameters will be modified each time a member joins or
leaves the group, providing protection against eavesdropping
and privacy violation. However, this proposed scheme needs
additional security measurements to ensure true protection,
since, as the authors admit, it does not account for the fact that
the trustworthiness of the group depends on the trustworthiness
of its leader. Also, this approach assumes that all traffic
participants respect the speed limitations, or at least they do
not surpass them by a lot. This means that a high speed vehicle
passing by low-speed groups will force the Group Leaders to
generate new encryption keys once the vehicle enters their
300m radius and again when it leaves it, inducing additional
processing time. Instead, that one vehicle could be its own
Fig. 3. Lidar capture from a real environment [12]
group, independent of the others, because of its significantly
higher speed.
C. V2V authentication
The third approach to vehicle authentication in VANETs is
the V2V authentication scheme, in which no trusted authorities
are involved in verifying the identities of the traffic partici-
pants. Lim et al. [12] propose an innovative approach, using
LIDAR systems in combination with camera sensors to se-
curely authenticate the messages transmitted in a VANET. The
authors explain how, since vehicles communicate through the
DSRC technology and traffic messages are transmitted every
100ms, small overheads and quick authentication mechanisms
have to be implemented. Before reception, the messages have
to be verified and the sender has to be authenticated by the
receiving vehicle.
To achieve this, cameras and Lidars are used to scan the
environment as illustrated in Fig. 3 and generate localization
maps containing the current position, as well as the distance
and angles to surrounding objects. Then, vehicles communi-
cate their maps and compare them. If the relative positions
of the vehicles to each other matches, then the messages
are authenticated. This will prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.
However, they do not provide a traceability mechanism, so a
malicious vehicle can still send out disorienting information
in a traffic scenario and no trusted authority would be able to
relate the driver’s identity to the incidents.
Table 1 provides an overview of the methods used for ensur-
ing secure authentication. It can be noted that the IBV scheme
and the BS scheme have the least damaging disadvantages
in terms of security. Taking into account the efficiency of
the signature-verification schemes they put forward, the BS
scheme solves its predecessor’s packet loss problem, although
it induces a load-proportional delay.
IV. MESSAGE INTEGRITY
Data integrity assists in defining accuracy, consistency and
completeness of the message content used during the commu-
nication process. Data integrity is a process of sending infor-
mation or data from various sources through which users can
receive it in a secured manner without any manipulations or
alterations to the original data. For VANETs, data integrity can
be improved through the use of PKI, cryptography revocation
mechanisms, as well as trust management techniques that will
avoid the nodes trying to drop, modify, or inject new messages
into the communication path [13].
TABLE I
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Using the traditional digital signatures within messages to
ensure privacy and integrity of the communication, becomes
challenging in VANET due to the very large number of
public/private key pairs that need to be stored by the vehicles.
Additionally, as these keys must be updated/changed often it
puts even more pressure on the security of key distribution,
management and storage. To overcome these challenges, Guo
et al. [14] propose the use of a group signature-based security
scheme that achieves authenticity, data integrity, anonymity,
and accountability. The proposed scheme will allow group
members to sign messages on behalf of the group without
revealing the identity of the group member who signed.
Lin et al. [15] introduced a social-tier-assisted packet
forwarding protocol, referred to as STAP, that enables the
receiver-location privacy preservation in VANETs. The authors
define the social tier as a virtual tier formed by social spots,
such as shopping malls, busy streets, etc. The RSUs are then
deployed at these main social spots to form the STAP and
achieve data integrity.
Another group signature and identity-based signature
(GSIS) was introduced in [16]. The authors make use of
the group signature to secure the communication between
OBUs and OBUs. Whereas, a signature scheme using ID-
based cryptography (IBC) is implemented in the RSUs to
digitally sign the messages and ensure its authenticity. The
proposed solution can also be used to trace each vehicle in
case of misbehaviour.
A dynamic data integrity auditing scheme is proposed in
[17] to support data privacy protection in VANETs. A system
model of the data integrity auditing is illustrated in Fig. 4
and consists of three main entities: Tenant - who is in fact
the data owner and represents the variety of sensing devices
within the vehicle that needs to outsource the data collected to
the cloud service provider. Cloud Service Provider - provides
the computing, storage and network resources required by the
tenant. Third-Party Auditor - is performing the professional
data integrity auditing for an authorized tenant by challenging
the cloud service provider. It also shares a group of decryption
Fig. 4. System model of the data integrity auditing [17]
keys with the tenant. Additionally, bilinear pairing mapping
and Boneh-Lynn-Shacham digital signature mechanism were
used to ensure that the third-party auditor cannot steal data
privacy during the process of data integrity auditing.
Trying to overcome the security risks that appear when the
vehicles nodes send their sensor data to a trusted center, Zhang
et al. [18] proposed a data security sharing and storage system
based on the consortium blockchain (DSSCB).The authors
propose the use of bilinear pairing for elliptic curves to ensure
the reliability and integrity when transmitting the data to a
node. Additionally, the consortium blockchain technology to-
gether with the use of smart contracts provides a decentralized,
secure and reliable database maintained by the entire network.
V. REMAINING CHALLENGES AND OPEN ISSUES
The future 5G-V2X paradigm aims at enabling effective
connected cars communication as well as fully automated driv-
ing that could increase road safety and improve traffic manage-
ment. However, in order to enable support for these services
and a new set of related applications (e.g., traffic prediction,
bird’s eye view at the road intersection, intelligent navigation
systems, 4K live video streaming, cooperative collision avoid-
ance systems) one of the key requirements is provisioning
of ultra-reliable low latency communication which cannot be
guaranteed by the current underlying networks. Apart from
the communication challenges, any misbehavior or malicious
alternation within this highly dynamic environment where
there is a significant number of messages exchanged among
entities could lead to catastrophic accidents. Consequently, the
communication security including the message authentication
and data integrity are of paramount importance for attack pre-
vention [19] within the future cooperative connected intelligent
transportation environment.
Some of the most common attacks on data integrity and
authentication within VANETs that need to be overcome are
identified as follows [20]: Masquerading Attack - where the
attacker makes use of a registered user ID and password to
enter the system and broadcast false messages; Replay Attack
- where the attacker aims at repeating or delaying transmission
fraudulently; Message Tampering Attack - where the attacker
modifies or alters messages for transmission [21]; Illusion
Attack - where malicious data from sensors is collected and
used to generate traffic warning messages that may create
illusions to cars at its neighborhood [22]. This illusion attack
could cause car accidents, traffic jams and could decrease the
VANETs performance.
Apart from the traditional attacks, such as eavesdropping,
man in the middle attack, or impersonation, some more
advanced attacks could be used to capture private information
within the VANETs, such as [8]: packet analysis attack - where
the sender identity is disclosed by analyzing a packet; packet
tracing attacks - where the source and destination of a packet
could be traced; linkage attacks - the pseudonyms of a user
are linked based on the public information; movement tracking
attacks - where the vehicle is traced based on its physical
position and moving patterns from captured messages; identity
revealing attacks - where the identity, moving path, and
physical position of a specific vehicle are predicted from
routine traffic messages; collusion attacks - information about
a target user could be disclosed by collaborative adversaries;
inference attacks - where a target user is identified based on
the differences between multiple subjects; and deanonymiza-
tion/reidentification attacks - the target user is re-identified by
analyzing the correlations and differences of a large volume
of data.
It is obvious that there are many remaining open issues
that need to be addressed, and that the safety implications of
the future transportation system cannot be taken lightly as the
cyber security and the preservation of privacy and information
about the drivers, pedestrians and the road infrastructure is of
paramount importance to avoid catastrophic scenarios.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The advancements in technology lead the way towards a
connected intelligent cooperative transportation system. This
paper discusses the most important aspects of security in
VANETs and provides a comprehensive survey of existing
proposed techniques for ensuring privacy, authentication, and
message integrity within the context of vehicular networks.
However, the mainstream uptake depends on closing the gap
for the remaining open issues in terms of secure communi-
cation between vehicles as well as the road infrastructure.
From the challenges identified in this work, it is clear that
a standardised approach is required and the governance will
need to ensure flexibility and resiliency while maintaining the
necessary levels of security and privacy.
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